2014-A Centenary and a Discovery. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 59 December 2014 by Biscop, Sven
2014: a centenary and a discovery  
Sven Biscop 
It is almost as if engaging in war is easier 
than thinking about war. In the year of 
the commemoration of the First World 
War, Europe is facing several wars on its 
borders, and European forces are 
actively engaged in Iraq and Mali. But is 
anyone thinking about the strategic 
objectives? 
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abroad, the EU translated this into a regional 
strategy: the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). This sought to stimulate the 
neighbouring governments to provide 
equitably for the security, prosperity and 
freedom of all their citizens, in return for aid, 
market access and visa facilitation. The EU 
had already appraised the intransigence of 
many regimes to these aims (not helped by its 
own inconsistent implementation).  
 
What it had not counted on was that others 
would actively try to halt and reverse its 
strategy by force of arms. This possibility was 
simply not part of the collective worldview of 
the EU. It was part of the national thinking in 
some of the capitals, but that tended to be 
one-dimensional. Some member states had 
their eye on Russia, others on jihadism, many 
on migration. Taken all together, these 
national views could have been the building-
blocks of a comprehensive collective outlook. 
But the opposite happened: national views 
negated rather than reinforced each other. 
Consequently the EU as a whole did not adapt 
its strategy to the real situation surrounding it 
and in 2014 simply carried on with the ENP as 
before, even after the upheaval of the Arab 
Spring and in the face of dire warnings about 
Ukraine.  
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You cannot be half strategic. Either you know 
what you want and you act accordingly, or you 
do not. Having a strategy does not guarantee 
success, for other actors will obviously be 
pursuing a strategy of their own that may be at 
odds with yours. Nor does not having a 
strategy guarantee failure, as others may act 
even less soundly than you. And you can 
simply get lucky, of course. ‘I know he’s a 
good general, but is he lucky?’, asked 
Napoleon. Bad generals rarely stay lucky for 
long though.  
 
FACING WAR  
Through the European Union (EU), the 
countries of Europe were pursuing a 
somewhat vaguely defined grand strategy, with, 
as the 2003 European Security Strategy has it, 
its ultimate aim being ‘a world of well 
governed democratic states’. For its own near 
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This was bad strategy and so Europe’s luck ran 
out. As 2015 arrives, the EU is facing war in 
Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Mali. If the EU 
cannot be blamed for these wars, its policies 
did not do much to prevent them either; now 
it is a matter of whether they can stop them. 
The experiences of 2014 engender a major 
question: is Europe capable of thinking about 
these vital geopolitical matters collectively?  
 
ENGAGING IN WAR  
With regard to the Ukraine crisis, the shooting 
down of flight MH17 forced the EU’s hand. 
Thanks also to German leadership, the EU 
displayed unity and resolve in adopting 
sanctions that are seriously hurting the Russian 
economy. That is tactics though. Has the EU 
debated which end-state it is seeking to 
achieve both for Ukraine and for its long-term 
relationship with Russia? What are the 
conditions for the sanctions to be lifted? If the 
EU does not know for itself, then how does it 
imagine the sanctions will send the right 
message to Putin?  
 
Furthermore, to the extent that a strategic 
debate is taking place, it is split between two 
forums: the EU and NATO. This artificial 
separation of the diplomatic and defence 
dimensions of the same strategic issue is 
completely at odds with all principles of 
strategy – and with the comprehensive 
approach that both organisations like to vaunt.  
 
If European actions in the east could at least 
constitute the beginning of a strategy, its 
engagement in the Middle East is anything but 
strategic. It is also much less united; e.g. just a 
handful of countries have joined the US-led air 
campaign against the so-called Islamic State 
(IS). That campaign was probably inevitable in 
order to at least contain the IS and create 
some breathing space, but that should then be 
used for some urgent strategic reflection. Bien 
étonnés de se trouver ensemble, Americans, 
Europeans, Saudis, Iranians and others are all 
fighting the IS, but this coalition of 
opportunity will not last long if the political 
end-state that it is fighting for is not defined. 
Certainly no Iraqi army, no matter how well 
trained or lavishly equipped, will fight if it does 
not know what for.  
 
At least Iraq and Syria are on Europe’s radar 
screen – is anybody still thinking about Libya, 
where for lack of political and economic 
follow-up the results of the military 
intervention that Europeans initiated have 
been completely undone? The EU’s truly 
strategic engagement is that with Iran: more 
than anybody else Europe has been the driving 
force of the negotiations that could lead to a 
normalisation of relations and the involvement 
of Iran in a new regional arrangement; without 
Iran no stable arrangement can be imagined.  
 
Fortunately things are looking up in the Horn 
of Africa and in the Sahel, where EU 
engagement is framed in a more or less 
thought-through regional strategy. Progress is 
slow and engagement on the ground limited, 
for neither European nor regional 
governments like to see boots on the ground, 
so it will have to be sustained for a long time 
to come, but at least things are moving in the 
right direction.  
 
THINKING ABOUT WAR  
These enormous challenges bring us back to 
the question: who is thinking about them? 
Rather frighteningly there does not seem to be 
any service or body in the EU where the 
inconvenient strategic questions outlined 
above are being asked, possible responses 
elaborated and choices made.  
 
One reason is that many member states do not 
want to have this debate. Many seem to think 
that as far as the east is concerned, it is a 
matter for NATO. That betrays a limited grasp 
of strategy, for nothing that NATO as a 
military alliance can do makes sense without an 
answer to the question of how Europe 
envisages its future relations with Russia and 
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Ukraine – which can only be answered through 
the EU. When it comes to the south, many 
capitals are merely waiting for the US to come 
up with all the answers. That does not seem very 
wise when Obama himself has as much as 
admitted that actually he does not have a clue.  
 
Another reason is however that EU institutions 
are ill-adapted to this kind of debate. At the 
administrative level, the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) collects and processes a 
wealth of information and intelligence. But this 
situational awareness is then not being translated 
into long-term analysis, feeding into strategic 
choices, nor into permanent prudent planning, 
providing continuously updated policy options 
for the short and medium term within the 
strategic framework that has been chosen. Both 
functions require much more capacity than they 
are currently being allocated. Both should be 
directly attached to the High Representative, to 
prepare her to put these difficult questions on 
the agenda at the political level, in the Foreign 
Affairs Council that she chairs, or if necessary in 
the European Council, via its President.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Making strategy in collective decision-making 
bodies with twenty-eight member states will 
never be self-evident, but with the right 
strategic and planning support a driven High 
Representative can at least force the capitals to 
acknowledge the questions. Pretending not to 
see them will not make them go away and 
ultimately will put Europe at risk. A hundred 
years after the First World War, Europe has 
discovered that as long as not all nations have 
joined the community of ‘well governed 
democratic states’, geopolitics still matter, and 
strategy will be required to deal with the 
challenges that the unfortunately less peaceful 
world around Europe poses.  
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